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Introduction 
 
Our task, reflected in this report, was to assess the government’s role in achieving long-
term, safe recovery of the Gulf coast communities from the catastrophic disaster of 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the early fall of 2005. The focus is on its catastrophic 
nature and the ability of our society to deal with such. This report offers our analysis with 
a focus on the federal government, per the national policy interests of the Ford 
Foundation.  A companion book from the research is under preparation; it will consider 
the same question with the state and local government focus added to the federal 
response.  
 
Given this first assignment, one would expect that we would carefully consider how much 
of a role the federal government should play. However, we were surprised by how strong 
each of the subgroups of researchers concluded it should be, independent of the 
conclusions of the others.  Our surprise was due to the fact that each one of us believes in 
and is committed to supporting the important role of local, engaged citizens and the 
governments who represent them in achieving disaster resiliency and safe recovery when 
disasters do occur.  Capacity should be built at the local and state level. We concur with 
FEMA Director Fugate who stated in a June 2010 speech: “FEMA is only one part of the 
nation’s emergency management team.  It’s at the state, tribal and local level that some of 
the most important work in preparedness and response happens.”  
 
In the recovery from Hurricane Katrina so many problems occurred, opportunities were 
missed, and suffering enhanced many times fold because of the lack of an organized, 
systematic response that we think we have no choice but to recommend the achievement 
of a more comprehensive strategic federal framework joining together all government 
levels in order for there to be hope of achieving successful catastrophic recovery. Each sub 
study group – Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Mitigation -- came to the 
same conclusion independently: A stronger federal role is needed for recovery from a 
catastrophe because catastrophes are different from ‘regular’ disasters -- they happen too 
infrequently for any state and its local governments to have regular experiences with 
them and thus to be able to develop an appropriate well-developed response; and 
catastrophes create havoc that incapacitates state/local organizational response and 
recovery that is in place in advance of the event.  
 
You will not see in these recommendations broad encouragement to “send more money” 
although some of our practitioner advisors remind us that in some of the potential 
impacts of our recommendations, we have. Our recommendations are for the federal 
system to make more of a commitment to have the necessary organizational goals and 
implementation practices including a well-prepared staff (from whatever source they 
come) to support the state and local response. In order for any state in the country and 
the residents who are in the catastrophe “footprint” to make it through the experience 
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and to recover well and more safely, the federal government cannot absolve itself from an 
important collaborative role and be “keeper of the knowledge” of how to implement a 
recovery from catastrophe.  
 
Additionally, the recovery from future catastrophes in the United States must be 
accomplished in a more compassionate manner: namely in a more rapid, more efficient 
and a more successful way. That is compassion in our terms. The spirit of the Stafford Act 
and the federal system is for the recovery to be managed by the lowest level of 
government possible. In the case of a catastrophe, we argue that the federal government 
cannot wait to see how much the state and local governments are able to do and then to 
fill in what is remaining. The delay is much too harmful and so lacks the spirit and reality 
of compassion. Assume there will be a need for significant federal involvement, prepare 
for it and put the implementation into effect immediately when such an event occurs. 
Preparation for the worst case can be scaled down. We unanimously believe, and our 
position is supported by the work of others, that the reverse, scaling up, is extremely 
difficult to achieve. The federal government cannot be distant from the recovery; it must 
take an active, effective supportive role in every phase, beyond what occurred in Katrina.  
 
As these introductory comments are being refined to meet a June 30, 2010 Ford 
Foundation deadline for the final report, we are eight weeks into the BP Deepwater 
Horizon oil leak catastrophe. Unfortunately, all evidence from the media and our own 
observations of what is transpiring indicate that we would come to the same conclusion if 
we were evaluating the federal response to BP leak: The federal response is stunningly 
inadequate. Similarly, we can only assume that the long-term recovery will follow the 
same unfortunate path as did that of the Katrina/Rita event. Given that both catastrophes 
have occurred over the very same Gulf coast footprint in which most of the research team 
dwell, we anticipate five years from now we will be compelled to revisit our conclusions 
during a second case analysis similar to this one.  
 
The remaining recommendations of this report are wide ranging. We present them 
grouped in three themes per the Stafford Act organization: Public Assistance, Human 
Recovery (Individual Assistance) and Mitigation. Prior to these sections you will read 
sections discussing: issues about catastrophic annexes and triggers, the policy framework 
in which we couched our research and our research methods. Separate companion 
documents expand the three themes – Public Assistance (PA), Individual Assistance (IA), 
and Mitigation.  We also refer you to a fourth companion report done in conjunction with 
this study which considers the contribution that the Systems Engineering Approach can 
make towards broad reform. We need the reform; unfortunately right now only closed 
aspects of production seem to be able to take full advantage of the systems approach. We 
offer the report to you to consider how the logic of it might be useful. Finally, you will 
notice differences in the organization of the sub reports from the format of the sections of 
this report. We refined the draft of this primary document after the response to our work 
during our presentation on Capitol Hill in April, 2010. 
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Catastrophic Annex or Triggers or “Major” Disasters? 
 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita introduced us to a new level of disaster within the United 
States, one which observers are now labeling a “catastrophe.” Given that the focus of this 
research is the long-term recovery from a catastrophe, we would like to offer some 
thoughts about the use of the term and its linkage to different policy and implementation 
options when a major disaster occurs. The Post Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act (PKEMRA) defines catastrophes in terms of “extraordinary levels of 
casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including 
mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions in an area.” 
 
Such disasters are different from lesser incidents, not only because of the scope of damage 
and the amount of aid required, but also because the need for swift, decisive, and 
successful action extends well beyond the initial response into the recovery phase, 
including long-term recovery. We have observed that recognition of those needs – swift, 
decisive, successful action -- was absent from a true appreciation of an appropriate 
response to the catastrophe surrounding Hurricanes Katrina/Rita. The reason is not only 
that a great many people are suffering but that delay may jeopardize recovery, itself. 
Bureaucratic norms with an emphasis on procedural conformity, as are dictated for less 
severe disasters, do not serve us well after a catastrophe. We do need special rules to 
speed the flow of assistance. One national official who testified during the May 12, 2010 
hearings held by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Sheila Crowley, 
President of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, advocated for a clearer 
definition of a catastrophic disaster that will “direct the President to intervene swiftly and 
comprehensively in such a case.” She continued: “States vary considerably in their 
capacity . . . .to respond to [catastrophic] emergencies. . . .” (pp. 1-2).  
 
To address the challenge of catastrophes, many authorities have called for a 
fundamentally different approach to them, a catastrophic annex that would change the 
rules for federal assistance (Blakely 2007, Merritt 2007, McCarthy 2009, Moss 2009, 
Rainwater 2009). We agree, in part, but the biggest changes have to come before a 
catastrophic incident – in the way we prepare for all disasters because we cannot know 
how big the next one will be. Essentially, we must build capacity for catastrophes and 
then use it as needed depending upon the level of disaster. This is the concept of a 
scalable response.  It is always possible to scale up quickly beyond the capacity that has 
already been built.   The emphasis must be on preparation, and the target for preparation 
must now be a disaster of the Katrina/Rita magnitude.  
 
Because recovery programs are intergovernmental, preparation must be intergovern-
mental, but roles will vary depending upon the type of preparation. Planning must take 
place at the community level – with varying degrees of support from other levels of 
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government. On the other hand, the federal government has to lead in preparation to 
manage recovery programs after a disaster. State and local governments may be 
overwhelmed and unable to act effectively. In addition it is not cost-effective to maintain 
adequate capacity, especially in human resources, in each state and community. 
Catastrophes are rare events, and most jurisdictions will never experience one. The 
federal government gains experience from all disasters in the country and can move 
assets where they are most needed. Thus, for example, FEMA needs a surge force capable 
of assisting applicants with a large number of project worksheets all at the same time. 
 
Here we return to the issue of a catastrophic annex. We do not favor a complete new set 
of procedures that will disrupt administration and may leave unanticipated gaps. We fear 
that an annex will appear to be a panacea and divert attention from the preparation that 
is needed. Rather, we will propose in our discussions of individual programs selective 
measures to push funds proactively into affected areas and hasten decision making.  
 
We also recommend that Congress define more precisely how a catastrophic declaration 
can be triggered. The PKEMRA definition is vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to 
the Administration and leading to pressures for overuse and inconsistencies over time. 
There should be one or more triggers or thresholds based on observations, such as fifty 
percent damage and an extended evacuation of fifty percent over a broad area. The 
difference between a trigger and a threshold is that the former would automatically 
produce a declaration whereas the later would simply open the possibility of a 
declaration, still allowing considerable discretion. A single trigger or threshold would 
apply to all programs while multiple triggers could be program-specific. Designing an 
appropriate trigger would be a challenge because no one can foresee the variety of events 
that might warrant catastrophic designation. For this reason a threshold might strike a 
better balance between the desire for clear rules and the need for judgment. 
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Policy Framework 
 
As is true with most policy arenas, the federal government’s approach to disasters has 
emerged from a largely disjointed series of decisions. It is only in response to major 
events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that we take time to identify the pieces as 
part of a whole and ask how they fit together. While the rest of this report deals with 
more specific programs, this section focuses on the broader framework within which they 
operate and, as a result, makes broader recommendations. 
 
The relationship among three elements is critical: policy/program, capacity, and task. 
Implementation depends on how well the design of the policy/program and the capacity 
of the implementing organization(s) fit the task at hand. Katrina/Rita was a catastrophe 
that created tasks of response and recovery beyond the capacity of existing organizations. 
To enhance performance we have to improve policy/program design and build capacity, 
but we also have to recognize that future tasks of response and recovery will be affected 
by existing policies. The damage from Katrina was a function of, not only of the size of 
the storm, but also policies that encouraged risk taking, discouraged mitigation, and, 
thereby, increased exponentially the subsequent task of recovery. In planning for future 
recovery we have to consider the interaction of all three elements.  
   
1. Preparation for Catastrophes. The nation was not prepared for a catastrophe like 
Katrina/Rita. As noted elsewhere in this report, catastrophes are different from normal 
disasters. Not only is the scope much broader, but the needs for response and recovery 
are much more urgent. We must design policies and build capacity for catastrophes. 
Fortunately, catastrophes are rare and most jurisdictions will never experience one. For 
this reason, preparation for a catastrophe is cost-effective only at the federal level. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1a. The federal government should base its disaster preparation on the likelihood 
of a catastrophe. 
1b. Preparation should follow the principle of scalable capacity, already enunciated 
in the National Response Framework, so that we have capacity for a catastrophe but can 
commit lesser amounts in lesser disasters. 
 
2. Risk Recognition. We have paid insufficient attention to multiple types of risk. Our 
primary focus has been on terrorism, more specifically the prevention of terrorism, to the 
relative neglect of natural disasters and industrial accidents, as Hurricane Katrina and the 
BP oil spill illustrate.  
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Recommendation: 
 
2a. To the greatest extent possible, emergency management activities should be 
promoted under an all-hazards framework that recognizes regional variations in risks and 
hazards. This risk profile will include terrorism, but we must understand that the risk of 
catastrophic terrorism is variable just as the risk of a catastrophic natural disaster is 
variable. 
 
3. Risk Reduction. Risk reduction has not been a cross-cutting policy goal. Many federal 
policies designed to promote development goals have also promoted risk taking without 
consideration of hazard implications. In order to decrease national exposure to risks we 
must insure that risk assessment is included in development decisions.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
3a. Any legislation related to economic stimulus, infrastructure, land use, housing, 
commercial development, and similar policies should include an assessment of the nature 
and extent of risks created or promoted by the legislation.  
3b. Environmental Impact Statements should be required to include discussion of 
the relationship between projects, hazard mitigation, and the natural environment. 
 
4. Attention to the Full Disaster Cycle. When the federal government has focused on 
natural disasters, the emphasis has been on relief with less attention to the disaster cycle: 
preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery. Relief is politically popular, but neglect 
of the full cycle is short-sighted. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
4a. The nation should give at least as much attention (not money) to preparedness, 
mitigation, and recovery as it does to the provision of disaster relief. Doing so would save 
money in the long run by reducing relief and recovery expenditures, thereby helping to 
meet the president’s resilience goals. 
 
5. Fragmented Responsibility. Responsibility for and oversight of federal disaster 
programs is fragmented and confusing, both in terms of management and congressional 
oversight. There are 86 congressional committees with oversight over DHS. There are at 
least 107 disaster relief programs under the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance 
(CFDA), of which over 50 are listed as "DHS" programs, even though they should 
probably be listed under FEMA to comply with the plain intent of the PKEMRA, which 
granted greater autonomy to FEMA.  
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
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5a. Clarify responsibilities and accountability for programs. Streamlined and 
comprehensive oversight will improve coordination, while increased FEMA autonomy 
will yield better performance in disasters, as recognized by Congress in the PKEMRA. 
5b. Mandate that all disaster preparation, response and recovery actions be 
integrated across all agencies and governmental levels from the perspective of victims. 
 
6. Emphasis on Cost Containment. A history of the Stafford Act and its 
implementation reveals a strong emphasis on cost containment. Such an emphasis is 
counter-productive for recovery and for long-term cost reduction, especially following a 
catastrophe.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
6a. Balance financial accountability with compassion: State that relief is a moral 
imperative as long as governments create or exacerbate risks. 
6b. Recognize the cost of delayed recovery in terms of human suffering and 
economic loss. 
6c. Appreciate the long-term cost saving of adequate funding of robust mitigation 
measures following a catastrophe. 
 
7. Learning from Disasters. Congress and the Executive Branch continue to make the 
same mistakes after disasters. "Lessons learned" documents are often little more than 
lessons "observed," or are congratulatory documents that emphasize what went well 
while not applying rigorous analysis to elements where performance can be improved.  
 
Recommendation:  
 
7a. All disasters should be studied by a post-disaster investigation team under 
FEMA or DHS. Models of such processes include the Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute’s (EERI) “Learning from Earthquakes” program funded by the NSF under the 
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), the NTSB‟s investigations of 
major aviation and other transport accidents, and NIST’s investigation of the collapse of 
the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001. 
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Notes on Methods 
 
The research design for this report uses multiple methods with both primary and 
secondary data. The first part of the design was to review the existing research on 
disasters in general and Hurricane Katrina specifically. For example, the research on the 
PA program began with a review of relevant testimonies, reports, articles, and books (104 
in all) to identify problems as perceived by participants representing three different 
perspectives: federal administrators, applicants, and third parties (e.g., academic 
researchers). This exercise yielded 236 problem statements, which fell into broad 
categories of flaws in program design and procedures, inadequate organizational capacity 
and preparation, and the magnitude of Katrina/Rita. The human recovery team analyzed 
nearly 175 research articles and reports to develop major areas of inquiry.  As part of the 
mitigation research, considerable effort was made to identify those planning processes 
and the plans that emerged from them (15 different types of documents were reviewed) 
that should have included strong mitigation components to determine if the effect of 
Katrina was a maturation of mitigation commitment.  The locales and levels of 
governmental units considered in the mitigation study varied according to topic.  For 
some, the different responsible state offices’ responses were examined, for others the local 
parishes (principally Orleans and Jefferson).  Regional analyses were done for the New 
Orleans Metropolitan area, the Southeast Louisiana area and for comparative purposes, 
the Atchafalaya Watershed.  Major themes were identified through the literature for all 
subsections. Further, a three-day meeting was held with the advisory team where the 
initial themes were further discussed and refined.  
 In the second phase of this project, each subsection team conducted interviews, 
focus groups and participant observations with local leaders in each area. Interviews were 
conducted with public officials including those at FEMA and HUD headquarters, those 
who represented the federal recovery office and were in the region, those who currently 
represent the Louisiana state emergency preparedness office and officials who represent 
parish governments within the New Orleans metropolitan areas. Citizens of the storms 
were interviewed to determine the challenges they faced as well as leaders of 
organizations who advocated for them were also interviewed (nearly forty interviews in 
all). 
  Observations were made of public meetings and committee meetings of recovery 
organizations focused on human recovery and mitigation (forty-five in all). In addition, 
case studies from Picayune, MS, and Jackson Barracks outside of New Orleans showed 
how two relatively well-prepared applicants dealt with the multitude of problems that 
beset them. 
  Analysis of both the secondary and primary data, using pattern matching 
techniques, led to the major recommendations in this report. Additionally, key 
informants on disasters were also asked to review the initial findings. At the end of this 
phase this interim report was written. In a third and final phase, recommendations were 
presented to select informants to ensure validity of findings.  
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Recommendations for Public Assistance  
 
Robert Montjoy, Monica Farris, and Joel Devalcourt 
 
We must also look at ways to speed up the infusion of eligible public assistance funding to 
communities, which can be financially devastated and thus unable to commence critical 
infrastructure repair projects without up-front funding.… I firmly believe that we can make 
our public assistance program less process-oriented and more outcome-driven. Craig 
Fugate (2009, 10) 
 
The need for speed in the delivery of public assistance following a Katrina-like 
catastrophe is even greater than after a “normal disaster.” Not only are many people 
displaced, but the facilities required to sustain economic and social life are devastated 
over a wide area. Delay can be deadly to a region. Yet, assistance must not be haphazard. 
To be capable of delivering prompt assistance in an orderly fashion the federal 
government should build capacity at all levels, support preparation, promote action, and 
improve cost estimation procedures and the PW review and approval process. 
 
1.  Build capacity for major disasters. Human resources were simply inadequate to 
manage the load after Katrina/Rita: there were too few people with too little training and 
experience and too little time on the job before rotations. The results included delays and 
inconsistent interpretations of regulations. DHS-OIG attributed most of the problems 
following that catastrophe to human resource issues.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
1a:  FEMA must fully implement the mandate from PKEMRA for a Strategic Human 
Capital Plan (SHCP). Without such a plan it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of 
existing preparations because the goals and assumptions regarding human resource needs 
are not explicit. 
 1b:  Congress must provide the necessary support to ensure that FEMA’s human 
resource capacity is adequate for catastrophic disasters. The principal support will be in 
the form of funding once the plans for staffing and training are completed, but policy 
changes may be necessary to assist in the recruitment and maintenance of the Surge 
Capacity Force as outlined in GAO-09-59R.  
1c:  All levels of government should make training and mission readiness assessment 
for the PA program truly intergovernmental. PKMERA’s mandate for increased human 
resource capacity focuses only on the needs of FEMA. Yet it is difficult to imagine how 
FEMA can plan its own human capital without taking into account the capacities at other 
levels. Shared training is one means of gaining such knowledge. Further, inclusion of 
likely applicants and sub-applicants, as well as contractors, in training will not only 
reduce confusion and disagreement after a disaster, but can also improve the training, 
itself, by introducing different perspectives and questions. Such a goal implies more than 
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allowing selective representatives in classes: it requires proactive programs to encourage 
shared training at all levels.  
1d:  FEMA should investigate the possibility of housing part of its DAE reserve force 
in state Emergency Management offices. One PA specialist in each state could 
serve several functions, including: 1. being available for call-up as FEMA representatives 
on an as-needed in a major disaster (like military reservists or members of the Urban 
Search and Rescue Program) and 2. providing training and preparation assessment for 
local governments.  
1e: FEMA should explore the possibility of creating a national certification program 
for private companies that assist in disaster management. It is not cost-effective for 
communities to maintain sufficient staff to handle the large numbers of PA applications 
necessary after a catastrophe. Disaster management firms can be of great assistance to 
communities, but communities must first contract with these firms, about which they 
usually know very little, for services with which they not familiar, and in time frames that 
provide little opportunity for due diligence. National certification would help 
communities to screen firms and would give firms a performance incentive to maintain 
certification. Standard contracts would also help communities avoid mistakes and reduce 
negotiation time. 
 
2.  Support preparation. An important lesson from Katrina is that the recovery phase of 
disaster management requires thorough pre-disaster preparation, much as the response 
phase does. Most of that preparation must take place at the community level. FEMA 
cannot force communities to prepare, but it can encourage and assist them.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2a: Provide information and technical assistance in community preparation. Lessons 
learned from Katrina and other disasters should help communities prepare for disasters. 
At a minimum, a report on useful preparatory actions would give communities a checklist 
to consider. Examples relevant to the PA program include: pre-disaster documentation, 
advance contracting, assessment of potential debris and identification of appropriate 
disposal sites, evaluation of ordinances regarding access to private property, adoption of 
uniform building codes and standards, and strategic planning that could guide rebuilding 
decisions.  
2b:  Create a program to rate community preparation. Such a program could be 
patterned after the Community Rating System (CRS) for the National Flood Insurance 
Program.  
2c:  Incentivize participation in the rating system by grants and/or the commitment 
of a higher federal share after a disaster. One option would be the awarding of extra points 
for relevant competitive grants programs. Another would be the commitment of a higher 
federal share (e.g.an additional 5 percentage points) for the PA program after a disaster.  
2d: Conduct studies to assess the requirements, advantages, and disadvantages of 
establishing a federal insurance program and requiring participation in it as part of the PA 
program. In principle, insurance has many advantages over a grant program. Potential 
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beneficiaries help to pay the costs. Differential rates can be used to reward preparation 
and mitigation. Insurance contracts can also require periodic assessment of property 
values. There are, of course, many problems in making a sound program for disasters, as 
the experience of the NFIP demonstrates. It should be possible, however, to design a 
program that places the federal government at no greater liability than it has now under 
the PA program.  
 
3.  Promote action. After Katrina/Rita, FEMA struggled with rules that did not fit 
situations and procedures that required multiple levels of approval. The gain in 
procedural conformity and possible savings in the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse 
must be weighed against the enormous cost in human suffering and reduced economic 
output caused by delayed recovery. 
 
Recommendations: 
  
3a: Design a trigger or threshold for the declaration of a catastrophe. The PKEMRA 
definition of a catastrophe is vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to the 
Administration and leading to pressures for overuse and inconsistencies over time. There 
should be one or more triggers or thresholds based on observations, such as fifty percent 
damage and fifty percent evacuation over a broad area. The difference between a trigger 
and a threshold is that the former would automatically produce a declaration whereas the 
later would simply open the possibility of a declaration, still allowing some, reduced 
discretion.  
3b: Use forward funding and a forgivable loan program to make federal aid more 
readily accessibility. PA is a reimbursement program that requires a non-federal match. 
Both features restrict the ability of devastated communities to start projects. A 100 
percent federal share upon the declaration of a catastrophe would solve the match 
problem, but not the need for advance funding. Further, a 100 percent federal share 
removes incentives for applicants to exercise restraint. A loan that can be used as match 
and later forgiven under certain conditions allows quick starts for approved projects and 
later review as more information becomes available. The Community Disaster Loan 
(CDL) program is a promising vehicle, but it would have to be revised to serve this 
broader purpose. We suggest the following actions for catastrophes: advance 50 percent 
of the cost estimate for approved projects; do not delay grants for insurance settlements 
but recover insurance payments after the fact; remove the cap on CDL loans; and allow 
the use of CDL funds as non-federal match. 
3c: Push decision making down the hierarchy by raising the cap on small projects to 
reduce the levels of review. While it may be appropriate to raise the cap for all disasters, 
there is certainly justification for a higher cap in catastrophes. The greater scope of 
damage means that large numbers of cases can clog the review system. Catastrophic 
circumstances should shift the balance between speed of action and prevention of errors 
toward the former.  
3d: Enable and require the federal government to take responsibility for its decisions 
in the PA program. De-obligation of funds can leave states and communities holding the 
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bag on projects that have already been started. The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (DHS-
OIG) noted this problem. It should be accepted that in a crisis, as in battle, there will be 
errors, or simply different conclusions about appropriate actions. The remedy should not 
be to punish the victims. There should be clear rules about who can make commitments 
for FEMA and how they can do so, but commitments once made should not be reversed 
except in cases of fraud. 
3e: Record and report performance measures based on outcomes and customer 
satisfaction. DHS-OIG found that FEMA was tracking only two of the four performance 
measures it had adopted, measuring the obligation of funds but leaving out closure rates 
and customer satisfaction. Implementation of a new database should solve this problem. 
 
4. Improve cost estimation procedures. Initial estimates are very important because 
they are the basis for agreement, or disagreement, on PWs and they set caps for 
alternative and improved projects.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
4a: Regularly evaluate cost estimation procedures. FEMA has used an expert panel 
to improve cost estimation procedures, but there appears to be no regularly produced 
data comparing initial estimates with final costs. There should still be plenty of cases to 
use in assessing the accuracy of initial estimates under a variety of conditions. The 
argument that a catastrophe significantly affects market conditions could be tested using 
data from Katrina/Rita, for example. 
 4b: Change training and reporting procedures to reduce the use of “0”or 
unrealistically low estimates in PWs. After Katrina/Rita there were numerous reports of 
PWs being initiated with unrealistically low estimates just to get them started. As a result, 
many projects went through multiple versions, as the GAO noted. This practice can lead 
to delays as applicants appeal decisions, especially when the estimate sets a cap for future 
work, and add to the workload of already overburdened staff at all levels. 
4c: Encourage pre-disaster documentation of conditions by publishing examples and 
standards. Distinguishing disaster-related damage, which is eligible for assistance, from 
pre-disaster condition, which is not, as one of the major challenges that FEMA faced. This 
problem could be reduced with better pre-disaster documentation. FEMA could 
encourage pre-disaster documentation and reduce post-disaster disagreement by setting 
and publishing standards indicating what it would accept.  
 
5. Improve the PW review and approval process. After Katrina/Rita there were 
complaints of lost documents, inability to track PWs, inconsistency of decisions, 
insufficient information on denials, and lack of an independent appeals process. Much of 
the problem can be related to insufficient numbers of trained personnel, a problem we 
addressed above. But other changes could help as well. 
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Recommendations: 
 
5a: Implement a tracking system for PWs. The EMMIE system that is coming on 
line would appear to meet this need. 
5b: Require FEMA to give reasons for denials in writing and tell applicants of any 
documentation needed. This would seem to be a basic requirement of transparency.  
5c: Create an independent appeal process for large projects. The experience with the 
appeals process created for Katrina/Rita demonstrated the value of an independent 
review. 
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Recommendations for Human Recovery 
Case Management, Mental Health and the Role of Non-Profits 
Pamela Jenkins, Branda Nowell and Michelle Gremillion 
 
 
Since August 2005, individuals and families in the Gulf Coast area face enormous 
challenges to recovery. After a catastrophe, individuals and families have to build back 
nearly every facet of their lives. The multi-dimensionality of their recovery involves a 
myriad of resources: housing, health care, employment, schools, and day care1. In this 
section, we discuss recommendations for the management of the human recovery. 
Specifically, we outline recommendations for providing services for ongoing mental 
health issues, case management after a catastrophe, and the role of non profits (both 
national and international) in recovery.  Providing individual assistance is so difficult that 
we undertook to explain only part of this recovery, realizing that there are other aspects 
that need analysis. We begin with one of the most serious and unaddressed problems of 
recovery, the mental health and well-being of individuals and families. 
 
RESOURCES FOR MENTAL HEALTH AFTER A DISASTER 
The psychological impacts of disaster include a broad range of symptoms ranging from 
simple reactions to serious post traumatic stress disorder. “The longer-term adverse 
health effects of the disaster can be expected to be substantial and require follow-up 
assessments to determine the need for mental health care services” (Weisler, Barbee, and 
Townsend, 2006, p. 586). While much of the literature is based on disasters; the data is 
emerging slowly about the long-term effects of the recovery from catastrophe. It is 
important to note that in a catastrophe, those supports (for example, family, 
neighborhood, and faith based organizations) that would provide informal help are 
greatly diminished.  
 
1. Identify resources for mental health in all stages of a catastrophe. The issues in 
funding for long term mental health care is problematic, because it is not clear what the 
long term effects of recovery are in a community, especially a community with an already 
at risk population. For example, The Stafford Act mandates that funding for SAMHSA 
mental health treatment only be used for crisis management, not for continuing 
treatment. “It has become clear in the wake of Katrina and Rita that the Stafford Act fails 
to fully address an event of catastrophic magnitude, inadequately providing for mental 
health services for displaced victims” (Boyle, 2007, p. 8).  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Housing remains central to recovery. While this section of this report does not include specific recommendations 
about housing, the need for housing and the issues of rebuilding are intertwined with the all of recovery issues. 
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Recommendations: 
 
1a. Amend the Stafford Act to allow states the financial flexibility to allocate funds 
for continuing treatment of individuals beyond immediate crisis management after 
disasters. 
1b. Create emergency provisions in Medicaid that provide flexibility to simplify the 
rules and extend Medicaid coverage with federal financing in a crisis situations.  
 
2. Define an effective mental health system. Before Hurricane Katrina, the mental 
health system still needed more support. “In Louisiana, the pre-hurricane mental health 
infrastructure was overcommitted and inadequate to meet the needs of all those with 
serious mental illness. The hurricanes only exacerbated existing problems both by 
destroying infrastructure, reducing the mental health workforce and creating a new 
population of people in desperate need of mental health services” (Boyle, 2007, p. 7). After 
Katrina, the mental health system had to be rebuilt with fewer people and few systems. 
Moreover, the reaction to Hurricane Katrina and the recovery created long term stress 
that goes beyond the normal stress of a disaster. Vulnerable populations, especially 
families with children, faced a myriad of social stressors.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
2a. Create provisions within the Stafford Act for catastrophic disasters that allow for 
longer term outpatient treatment of conditions clearly related to the exposure and recovery 
issues associated with the catastrophic event. 
2b. Changes should include both written procedures and personnel. “Written mental 
health response plans may help to ensure knowledge transfer from one event to another 
and from one person to another. Plans should include a designated disaster mental health 
coordinator with a clear job description, explicit mechanisms to build capacity by 
developing collaborative relationships with key agencies, and communication venues” 
(Elrod, Hamblen, and Norris, 2006, p. 168). Establish a curriculum that progresses 
through the process of a disaster mental health response. It would be helpful to develop 
online courses that augment traditional mental health training. During the event, states 
should be provided with a list of trainers that are matched to their event and audience. 
(Elrod, Hamdlen, and Norris 2006) 
 
3. Link Mental Health Recovery into other Recovery and Social Service Efforts. 
Many of the mental health services before Katrina were not coordinated well within the 
community. During recovery, mental health services need to be linked into more of the 
fabric of the wider social service network. Mental Health providers recognized that the 
sheer size and scope of disasters demand collaboration between responding and 
supporting agencies.  
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Recommendations: 
 
3a. Facilitate network development and referral protocols among mental health 
agencies and other social service agencies before the event. 
3b: Collaboration must be implemented before the event. Initiating collaborative 
relationships during a disaster was too late, too time consuming, and generally non-
productive due to the pressure of each agency trying to follow their own protocols.  
3c. Mental health providers need to share data on clients so that patients can be 
tracked across agencies to ensure continuity of care, public safety, and to prevent a 
disconnection from the other needed post disaster services. A database should be created to 
manage this task. 
 
CASE MANAGEMENT 
 
Prior to the response to Hurricane Katrina, very little of the case management was 
documented or significantly funded (Phillips, 2009). The following recommendations 
highlight the role of the federal government in managing lives after a catastrophe. The 
federal response is improving, but case management remains a critical issue for long-term 
recovery. 
 
1. Connect With People Who Need Help. Information about evacuees and their 
situation (location, health, housing, transportation) was difficult to obtain. Further, a lack 
of coordination among case management providers resulted in some victims not receiving 
case management and others receiving services from multiple agencies. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1a. Essential practices for coordination are defined by collaborating strategies and 
policies, procedures, and other methods for communicating and working across multiple 
agencies.  
1b. The process of requesting and receiving program/client data from federal 
partners must be planned for in advance. As some case data now exists (through multiple 
sources), it might be possible to maintain those networks built during Katrina. In the 
future, data management should have necessary resources. In the chaos of a catastrophic 
event, it was very difficult to find evacuees or to know which program they qualified for. 
The outreach across the country, but especially in flood-ravaged areas, was not 
consistent. Case management agencies stated that they faced challenges in obtaining 
timely and accurate information from FEMA. FEMA said requests for information did not 
meet their requirements. 
 
2. Navigating Without a Map. Initial confusion about funding and purpose of case 
management programs delayed local case management development. Local agencies had 
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difficulty knowing the parameters of the case management system to collaborate on the 
process. The confusion about which clients qualified for what program and how to obtain 
that information was staggering. 
 
Recommendations: 
   
2a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place and 
readily available as a contingency. The federal government could identify case 
management agencies in advance and include them in emergency response planning. 
2b. FEMA should facilitate the creation of a central clearinghouse for information on 
assistance programs and services both locally and federally. The service delivery challenges 
may have prevented some from receiving consistent help because of lack of 
understanding of multiple agencies’ roles and responsibilities. Service providers lacked a 
central repository of information that would help them guide clients through the 
confusing array of assistance programs and services available both locally and federally.  
 
3. Getting People the Help They Need through Bureaucratic Constraints. Case 
managers faced challenges in meeting client needs due to federal funding rules on direct 
assistance. Program eligibility requirements were also a barrier to providing disaster case 
management. Some funds were restricted to victims of a specific hurricane. Other 
guidelines restricted case management services to residents of FEMA housing only.  
 
Recommendations:  
 
3a. Access to material resources is essential to post-disaster recovery. Case 
management programs should have discretionary funds for low-cost unmet recovery 
needs and allow local decisions on the use of these funds. Case management agencies saw 
the need for direct financial assistance for items such as home repairs, clothing, or 
furniture as essential to helping clients, yet such assistance was not always available. 
Some programs were not allowed to make direct assistance payments, yet without direct 
service funds, short term needs become long-term issues. 
3b. Eligibility requirements should continue to be reviewed. This is an ongoing 
discussion of who should receive case management and the ability to meet the diverse 
needs of the population.  
 
4. Closing the Door before Closing the Deal. The federal government supported 
Disaster Case Management, but delays, breaks in funding and time limits hindered 
assistance. Throughout the response and recovery, there was variability in application, 
implementation and outreach to diverse populations.  
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Recommendation:  
 
4a. Consistent ongoing case protocols should be developed and provide adequate 
program periods. Some cases were closed not because clients’ needs had been met, but 
because the program was ending. 
 
5. Working in a Context of Overwhelming Need with Limited Capacity. 
Numerous sources noted the high staff turnover among case managers. This workforce 
problem creates great instability as clients didn’t know the name of their current 
manager. Large caseloads were barriers to meeting client needs. 
 
Recommendation: 
 
5a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place 
continuously as part of sustainability for human recovery in vulnerable areas. The federal 
government could identify case management agencies in advance and include them in 
emergency response planning. Effective case management requires service providers with 
adequate and stable staffing to create consistency and ensure clients receive adequate 
attention. It also requires agencies that have the capacity to serve as a bridge horizontally 
as well as vertically, connecting to both state and federal systems as well as with local 
level service providers in order to identify and connect people to the help they need. 
 
NON-PROFITS, FOUNDATIONS AND „HELP‟ 
 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were a critical part of New Orleans prior to the 
flooding, serving as a source of community and neighborhood strength and employment. 
International, national, and local NGO’s were an integral part of the response and 
ongoing recovery.  
 
1. Government Remains Ambivalent about the Integration of NGOs in a 
Coordinated Response To Disasters. Broad scale integration of local, national and 
international NGOs as part of a coordinated governmental response to catastrophic 
disasters requires administrative architecture and capacity that does not currently exist at 
the Federal and State levels. While there is a formalized structure in local and national 
VOADs, much of the government integration of NGOs in disaster response and long term 
recovery of the Gulf region is ad hoc without adequate planning before the storm. This 
has exacerbated gaps in coordination and ultimately service provision. Growing 
expectations for nonprofits and NGOS’ to assist and even play a leadership role in disaster 
response must be balanced against their own shortcomings and complexities.  
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Recommendations:    
 
1a. Further clarify the role of NGOs as part of a coordinated governmental response 
to catastrophic disasters in the Stafford Act. 
1b. Identify roles that appreciate and reflect the inherent strengths and limitations of 
NGOs and are accompanied by provisions for integrated planning and capacity building to 
ensure these roles can be fully executed. Because catastrophic disasters which overwhelm 
the resources and capacity of local, state, and federal government are infrequent, the 
capacity for broad scale inclusion of others such as local, national and international NGOs 
has not been adequately developed. Relief agencies both national and international 
continue to fragment services. NGO roles have not been formalized or integrated into 
local and state planning and recovery efforts. 
 
2. Creating Knowledge About Catastrophes for Non-Profits and Foundations. 
Foundations and national non-profits have the ability to draw national and international 
attention to the catastrophe, but many of these groups do not have the knowledge about 
disasters, especially recovery that will allow them to utilize best practices in their funding 
and their services. Recovery from catastrophe has a different trajectory than recovery 
from disasters. Rebuilding a community after a catastrophic disaster requires unique 
expertise that many NGOs and local government agencies likely lack. A great deal of 
funding was designated for immediate relief, but funds for recovery are not so available.  
 
Recommendations:  
 
2a. The tension between responses during normal time periods and in a disaster is 
critical. Because vulnerable areas are waiting for the next storm, government programs, 
national non-profits and foundations should work with local agencies to provide a set of 
programs that bridge the gap between times during a disaster and those more common 
time frames without a disaster. 
2b. Provide technical assistance in needs assessment and integrated planning to 
assist with social, cultural, and structural reconstruction. Create forums for issues of social 
justice in the reconstruction process to be addressed. 
 
3. Giving In a Catastrophe. With so many different types of groups involved in 
providing assistance, funders and organizations were often ‘stepping over each other.’ 
Further, as funders struggled to find ‘whom to fund’, the knowledge that funders relied 
on often came from a few sources.  
 
Recommendation:  
 
3a. Identify organizations that are positioned to serve as bridging/coordinating 
entities between national and international NGOs, state and local NGOs to aid in linking 
local needs to state and national resources. Foundations need to have multiple links on 
the ground in vulnerable areas before a major disaster. Too often, the funders found 
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themselves “in a hurry” to do something and funding was channeled through their 
existing – and often sparse – networks of local NGOs. Because these service delivery 
networks had structural holes, assistance was not adequately distributed.  
  
4. Doing Advocacy in a Catastrophe. Advocacy is a critical element for the 
individuals and families to negotiate their recovery. Many of the non-profits and 
foundations could not find mechanisms to provide resources for advocacy on behalf of 
individuals and families.  
 
Recommendations:  
 
4a. Recognize the importance of advocacy organizations in representing the voices of 
vulnerable populations and support their inclusion in relief and recovery planning and 
decision making forums. 
4b. Identify and support organizations that have existing expertise and legitimacy as 
advocates of vulnerable populations. The depth of the need for advocacy was not realized 
after Hurricane Katrina; there were many different definitions. Advocacy, however, was 
needed for many to receive the most basic of services including housing, food, and health 
services. 
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Recommendations for Hazard Mitigation  
 
Shirley Laska, Earthea Nance, KC King & Joel Devalcourt 
 
Sadly, catastrophes offer an incredible opportunity for communities to rebuild in a 
manner that reduces their vulnerability to similar future events and to put into place 
development and building requirements that will continue to guide such building into 
the future. This is the case because often so much of the community’s/region’s physical 
infrastructure is destroyed in a catastrophe. Not always, but usually, that massive 
destruction defines a catastrophe. Opportunities abound to rebuild more safely and to 
put into place more stringent building codes and land use plans that will support these 
goals and a broad commitment to prevent such events from ever occurring again. 
Combine the opportunity with the attention getter it is for the survivors and the society 
and you should have a winner for mitigation. Unfortunately, as you have already seen 
with the preceding assessment of Public Assistance and Individual Assistance, the 
outcome of coastal storm mitigation efforts after hurricanes Katrina/Rita left so much to 
be desired. In fact, with all of the problems with PA and IA, Mitigation implementation 
may in fact have had the worse failings of the three. Incredible opportunity missed. The 
recommendations that follow argue first for a much, much stronger commitment to 
hazard mitigation than was in place for these catastrophic storms. The recommendations 
also focus on  
 
1. Achieve robust mitigation commitment and implementation. A well-off culture 
(that believes it can “absorb” disaster impact) dismisses safety as no one’s responsibility. 
States, local communities and individuals can readily avoid doing anything real about risk 
and also not succeed when they really want to mitigate. Make it more attractive, feasible, 
and required. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1a. Promote and support non-structural mitigation including storm water 
management in a way similar to the growing “green” (resilience) industry that saw so 
clearly and took full advantage of the rebuilding opportunities in the Katrina/Rita recovery. 
Modernize the thinking and reinforce the multiple benefits approach to capture interest. 
“Reinvent” mitigation.  
1b. Mitigation should be required and incentivized by making federal mitigation 
programs flexible enough to handle the actual local risk profile and to capture local interest 
in achieving the risk reduction. Federal requirements and resourcing should make sense to 
the locals in terms of local risk reduction involvement, not be impediments for local 
“control” of the visioning and goal setting. 
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1c. Add a Mitigation Support Function to the Natural Disaster Recovery Framework 
in order to take full advantage of the mitigation prospects post a catastrophe and to 
promote image of Mitigation which is not an adequately recognized, valued concept like 
Emergency Management, despite the current push for disaster resiliency.  
 
2. Refine mitigation requirements to achieve more mitigation. Some mitigation 
requirements in place at the time have been found to be impediments to mitigation. 
While they were created for important reasons such as control of federal costs, the 
unanticipated outcome reduced mitigation in this post catastrophe case. 
 
Recommendations:  
 
2a. Eliminate all local match requirements for mitigation after a catastrophe (HMGP 
and PA). When mitigation is possible in as widespread a way as it is after a catastrophe, it is 
not the time to be “testing” the locals’ commitment to mitigation through a match or to 
save money at the front end. And, with the communities public coffers drained and 
without income, the requirement will stymie mitigation. The opportunity for cost saving 
in response and recovery to future events is just too great. 
2b. In a catastrophe, deem the mitigation of already listed/already approved at-risk 
Repetitive Loss properties and approved projects in a community’s Mitigation Plan “cost 
effective,” needing no additional calculations. The effort to do the post-catastrophe 
required analysis delays and reduces permanently the achievement of mitigation.  
 
3. Resource mitigation effort effectively. Delays and lack of focus on a broad view of 
mitigation outcomes rather than the “weeds” of each funding program, both permanently 
reduce achievement of mitigation. There is a rhythm of recovery that requires mitigation 
to be considered when the rebuilding is occurring and not as an afterthought. It must be 
efficiently implemented and with a firm grasp of the desired broad outcomes. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
 3a. In catastrophes, mandate federal responsibility for mitigation requiring FEMA to 
coordinate with the state to quickly have FEMA work directly with local communities on 
disaster-based mitigation programs similar to the commitment that currently exists (and 
recommendations to enhance it) to assist communities after a catastrophe in damage 
assessment, another key action for risk mitigation. Provide additional support to 
communities with compounded economic vulnerabilities and synchronize state and 
federal approval.  
3b. Reinstate Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team (IHMT) with balanced 
membership from federal, state and local or require states and counties/communities to 
establish their own for a catastrophe. Have it continue over the duration of the 
catastrophe recovery conducting regular assessments of performance of all levels of 
government involved, measure achievements and require adjustments to the mitigation 
efforts while the recovery is ongoing.  
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3c. After trigger of a catastrophe or multiple disaster declarations, require (and 
FEMA fund) in such designated counties and large communities a permanent Hazard 
Mitigation Office, with strong coordination function, just as an Emergency Management 
Office is now required by DHS. Require reporting of mitigation progress. Use these offices 
as a pilot for requiring such offices in all counties and large communities nationwide. 
This Hazard Mitigation Office is not merely a locus for administering federal mitigation 
funds; rather it is the core of conceiving and implementing vulnerability reduction 
activities.  
3d. Require communities to develop pre-disaster post-disaster redevelopment plans 
as mitigation plans are currently required and make it an eligible activity for federal 
funding.  
 
4. Fix the recovery burden placed on homeowners who are novices to major home 
repair and government red tape. Homeowners received funding to repair/build their 
second floor before they received their mitigation funds, i.e. funding for their first floor. 
Deaths, mental health breakdowns, loss of family finances and unbelievable pressures of 
family separation all occurred while family coordinators of the repair lived in FEMA 
trailers, worked fulltime and managed the contracting concurrently as other family 
members were scattered in dispersed temporary housing awaiting the repair (and 
mitigation) of their homes. With this burden, inexperienced homeowners were asked to 
negotiate, and re-negotiate repeatedly an ever-changing maze of procedures and 
requirements, in the hopes that some of it would eventually be meaningful and would 
produce a recovery outcome with mitigation. A better fictional account of such chaos and 
victim harm could not have been written. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
4a. In collaboration with state officials experienced in catastrophes and/or multiple 
disasters, FEMA officials develop best practices for creation of a state homeowner recovery 
program for a catastrophe. The impacted state, especially if it is a smaller state, is a victim 
of the catastrophe and is unable to create a successful massive response post event. The 
plan must be created at a template in advance. 
4b. Conduct a study to consider using SBA to calculate benefits and distribute 
recovery funds (from all federal sources for recovery and mitigation) for homeowners in 
catastrophic disasters in lieu of creating new state-level process.  
4c. Recognize the incredible trauma of the funding application/repair/rebuilding 
process for homeowners in a catastrophe and support them much more adequately to 
implement the application process and the repair/rebuilding steps. Nothing can pre-
prepare a homeowner victim for the experience. Fully acknowledge that and deliver in a 
usable manner with well-trained professional assistance information about the process 
with adaptive management of the information and staff knowledge to fit the situation as 
it modifies. This recommendation is not trivial. 
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5. Widen mitigation scope of classes of structures. FEMA’s aggressive mitigation 
advocacy and implementation is focused heavily on owner-occupied homes while a 
community is comprised of a range of structures, all important for its functioning. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
5a. Formulate equally aggressive mitigation advocacy for public buildings, 
commercial apartments, commercial buildings, public housing and buildings occupied by 
social services such as day care, schools, medical clinics and domestic violence shelters.  
5b. Require full enforcement of Executive Order (11988) for 1/500 year protection of 
critical structures and work to achieve this requirement for other public/commercial and 
commercial housing structures. All federal agencies that can play a role in achieving 
comprehensive community structure risk reduction should engage, especially HUD 
funding of Public Housing and Section 8.  
5c. Revamp Public Assistance implementation to incentivize and guarantee 
implementation of mitigation provisions after catastrophes.  
 
6. Realize importance and act on issue of scale of residential structures protected. 
As currently implemented HMGP narrowly emphasizes reducing the future risk of the 
pre-storm owners of the homes in the flooded area and almost all of the focus is on one 
structure at a time.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
6a. In a catastrophe allow all homes which attain a positive benefit/cost ratio in 
flooded areas to qualify for federal elevation funding, not just those that continue to be 
owned by the pre-storm owners.  
  6b. To achieve broader scale of risk reduction (not just one owner-occupied house at 
a time) FEMA should formalize encouragement of use of combination of eligible HMGP and 
CDBG mitigation measures for risk reduction benefits in conjunction with home elevation. 
It was begun post-Katrina/Rita but not in the earlier, more timely (greater opportunity) 
phase. 
 
7. Significantly improve and support quality risk information and communication. 
Scarcity of adequate access to risk data by public and local public officials reduces their 
ability to make informed decisions about risk. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
  7a. Provide local communities with better information about their local risk profiles 
including areas affected by dam and levee failures. The public’s right to know about 
environmental risk should extend to free and open access to environmental data and risk 
modeling software. There should be transparency about the calculation process for BFEs. 
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Conclusions 
 
 Across the globe, nation states increasingly face the challenges brought about by 
cascading disasters. In the first decade of the 21st century, the United States dealt with the 
terrorist acts of 9/11; Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the British Petroleum oil spill, and 
numerous floods and wildfires. Response to catastrophes needs to become the norm for 
governments’ role rather than the out of the ordinary experience. We cannot emphasize 
enough the need to build capacity at a federal level for the worst case scenario. It is not 
cost effective for the states to do this on their own, but rather requires concerted 
intergovernmental planning. As we illustrated, there are parts of this process in place; but 
a need for more systematic planning beginning with the federal government is 
imperative. 
 
 An integral part of the capacity to respond is to build on the considerable 
knowledge amassed from the major disasters of this decade alone. In our project, we 
reviewed hundreds of reports and analysis of the response. A critical set of strategies 
would be to put together all the knowledge in a single repository. Moreover, these reports 
need to be accessible to all types of researchers and practitioners. At the same time, there 
is a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge that may be lost. All the relief and 
response workers from insurance companies to federal government employees have now 
had at least five years experience in the field (some have had a great deal more). These 
people have invaluable knowledge that, for the most part, is not captured systematically. 
In other words, a system needs to be created transfer knowledge from one disaster to 
another. 
 
 At the same time, relationships among key actors need to be built prior to a 
catastrophe at all levels. What we learned from focus groups and individuals from all 
aspects of the catastrophe was the importance of prior knowledge of people in key 
positions.  These relationships are critical both in the immediate response and especially, 
as part of the long-term recovery. Research in this area could focus on how to build 
permanent mechanisms to ensure collaboration, especially given the rotation system 
which moves staff of all levels into and out of the disaster zone over the long-term 
recovery 
 
  As important as knowledge and people are to a successful recovery, the 
assumptions behind the process are valuable as well. This theme emerged in our own 
work, especially in the area of mitigation. From our review, the apparent lack of a timely 
commitment to mitigation reduced mitigation outcomes dramatically; precise actions to 
accomplish risk reduction should be part of future planning. An actual commitment to 
mitigation would translate into proactive ways to deal with risk at all levels. Further, this 
commitment to mitigation would be part of a larger effort to focus on outcomes rather 
than procedure. From our accounts, the focus on procedure in this catastrophe resulted 
in a fractured response, slowing down the recovery. 
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 Continuing research questions should focus on understanding how to build 
capacity by examining the already existing knowledge about catastrophes and linking to 
best practice in each area. Responding to catastrophes involves complex sets of actions, 
but if there is agreement on goals; then, successful response and recovery are possible. 
However, as we have already seen with the BP spill, little has changed within the five 
years since these terrible events. 
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2010 led an NSF-funded training and mentorship program, Enabling the Next Generation 
of Hazards and Disasters Researchers.   
 
Joel Devalcourt, CHART graduate research assistant, is currently completing his 
master’s thesis in Urban and Regional Planning at the University of New Orleans, 
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Shirley Laska, Ph.D. – is professor emerita of sociology and founding past director of the 
Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology at the University of New 
Orleans (UNO-CHART).  She has been conducting applied research in the field of 
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Robert Montjoy, Ph.D.  is University Research Professor at the University of New 
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environmental engineering committee. 
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and the process and evaluation of systems change.  Her research has received national 
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Academy of Management Public and Nonprofit Division.   Her published work appears in 
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Quarterly.   
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